With Morgan v. Gay, 2006 WL 2938309 (Oct. 16, 2006), the Third Circuit joins the Ninth, Tenth , and Eleventh Circuit in interpeting CAFA's remand appeal timing provision to mean precisely the opposite of what it says. CAFA permits appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to remand a removed case back to state court so long as the appeal is filed "not less than 7 days after entry of the [district court's] order." 28 U.S.C. §1453(c). As written, a litigant cannot appeal until day 7, but can then appeal years later. Of course, Congress meant to require appeal petitions to be filed expeditiously, so the provision should have read "not more than 7 days after entry of the order." It is fun to watch these courts reach this conclusion because to do so they have turn to the legislative history even though the statutory text itself is completely unambiguous (stupid, but not ambiguous), hence violating what some (though not all) see as a sacred principle of statutory construction.